Reinforcement learning models of error-driven learning and sequential-sampling models of decision 13
cognitive theory and a corresponding psychometric model simultaneously, by decomposing empirically 28 observed behavior into the latent cognitive processes that are thought to have caused the behavior. By 29 placing such models "in the middle" between behavioral data and neural data, they provide a unified 30 framework through which to interpret behavioral and neural data (Figure 1 ). 31
This approach has provided significant progress in our understanding of the neural underpinnings of 32 cognition, especially using two distinct classes of cognitive models: Reinforcement learning (RL) models 33 on the one hand, and sequential sampling models (SSMs) of decision making on the other. Hallmark framework. On first sight, such a merger seems at odds with the fact that these modelling frameworks 55 appear different in both the behavior they seek to explain, as well as the mechanisms proposed to do so. 56
For RL models (Sutton and Barto, 2018), the target behavior that is to be explained, is changes in choice 57 behavior due to error-driven learning in value-based decision making. Whereas implementations differ 58 between RL models, the core of the explanation of this change in behavior is that people maintain 59
representations of expected value (or utility), inform their choices based on these expected values, and 60 subsequently update them based on the difference between the expected value and actual outcome -61
which is referred to as the reward prediction error. 62
RL models using error-driven learning account for changes in the relative choice probabilities over 63 the course of learning, but do not typically account for concurrent (changes in) response latencies, a 64 dimension of the data that is often entirely ignored in the employed cognitive models. In contrast, SSMs 65
(Forstmann et al., 2016; Ratcliff et al., 2016) provide a comprehensive mechanistic account of the 66 decision stage, simultaneously explaining how choice accuracy and latencies arise from a common set of 67 latent cognitive processes (e.g., information processing speed, response caution, motor response time). 68
Like in the RL domain, specific implementations differ between SSMs, but they share the general idea 69 that people accumulate evidence over time for each choice option, until they reach a threshold level of 70 evidence, at which point they commit to a decision. Although processes driving decision making (e.g., processing speed, response caution) might be changed or 74
adjusted as learning progresses (e.g., via an explicit learning mechanism). 75
In short, the RL framework explains learning over time, but provides no mechanistic account of 76 decision making and ignores response time distributions. The SSM framework explains how decisions 77 arise from an evidence accumulation process and provide detailed fits to response time distributions, but 78 often ignores learning over time. From this perspective, the RL and SSM frameworks are complementary. 79
In what follows, we first review a theoretical grounding for the integration of the two classes of models, 80
followed by a review of the empirical efforts towards combining RL models with SSMs. Afterwards, we 81
argue that integration can work to the benefit of both modelling traditions: Accounting for response time 82
distributions provides a major benefit for RL models, and the inclusion of learning a major benefit for 83
SSMs. Finally, we highlight the exciting promises for cognitive science as well as model-based cognitive 84
neuroscience. 85
Linking RL and SSMs: Theory

86
To illustrate the general approach, we assume benchmark models for both the (so-called model-free 1 ) RL 87
and SSM frameworks, and assume the learning task to which the models are applied consists of two 88 stimuli. As briefly noted above, the core assumption of the RL models is that agents maintain an internal 89
representation of the expected value (or utility) associated with each stimulus and/or action, translate 90
these expected values into choices, and update their expected values based on the mismatch between the 91 expected values and actual outcomes. To formalize these notions, RL models consist of at least two 92 components: An update rule and a choice rule (or policy The second component of RL models is the choice rule, which is classically called the soft-max 111 function. Soft-max specifies the probability of choosing choice option i (out of N options) as: 112 113
where ߚ is a free parameter known as the inverse temperature, and ܳ is the expected value for choice 115 option i. With two choice alternatives, say A and B, this can be rewritten as:
highlighting that, in a two choice-alternative task, the difference in Q-values for both choice options 119 drives choice probabilities. 120
Crucially, soft-max only makes predictions for choice probabilities, and ignores a second dimension 121 of behavioral data: response latencies. This is not to say that response times are not acknowledged as a however, that contrary to the literature reviewed below, these papers did not explicitly model learning 127
dynamics. 128
The fundamental assumption of sequential sampling models is that, in order to decide, participants 129 accumulate noisy evidence until a threshold level of evidence is reached, and a decision is made. At that 130 point, the participant initiates a motor response. Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of the decision 131 process as proposed by the most popular SSM, the diffusion decision model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; 132
Ratcliff et al., 2016). The DDM specifically assumes that the difference in evidence for both choice 133 options is accumulated (i.e., the net 'attractiveness' of both choice options), according to:
where ‫ݔ‬ is the amount of accumulated evidence, ‫ݐ‬ is time, v is the mean speed of evidence accumulation 137
(the drift rate), and dW is Gaussian noise with standard deviation s (the diffusion coefficient). In words, 138
on each time step after stimulus onset, a sample is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean ‫ݒ‬ and 139 standard deviation ‫,ݏ‬ which are accumulated until either threshold -A or A is reached. Reaching a 140 threshold amounts to committing to a decision, at which point the motor processes that allow for an overt 141 response (typically a button press) are initiated. Evidence accumulation is often thought to start midway 142 between the two response thresholds, but the start point parameter z can be shifted towards either choice 
Assuming an unbiased diffusion process (i.e., z = 0), the probability of an error simplifies to:
If we further assume that the drift rate equals the difference between the evidence for both choice options 173
(v = Q A -Q B ), we obtain 174 175
which is formally equivalent to a soft-max function with the inverse temperature parameter equal to the 177 ratio 2A/s 2 . Conceptually, this is the amount of evidence required to commit to a decision, relative to the 178 amount of noise in evidence accumulation. In other words, the DDM with the drift rate parameter defined 179
as v = Q A -Q B provides an identical choice function as soft-max, but adds a latency function, of which the 180 exact shape depends on the ratio of the additional parameters A and s. In principle, the DDM is therefore 181 able to fit the exact same choice patterns as soft-max (which is important because soft-max has been 182
shown to fit well to empirical data) while adding a prediction of entire response time distributions. 183
Note that this equivalence has been described before ( able to either approximate soft-max or can even be formally equivalent as well (notably, Tuerlinckx and 188
De Boeck, 2005, describe a second equivalence using a racing accumulator model).
189
We highlight the mathematical relations between soft-max and SSMs here for three reasons. Firstly, 190
they offer a natural departure point to link SSM parameters with variables from RL models, while 191
acknowledging that it is an empirical question whether this linking function provides the best account of 192 behavioral data. Secondly, these relations provide an interesting cognitive interpretation of the soft-max 193 inverse temperature parameter in terms of response caution (i.e., thresholds), which we discuss further 194
below. Thirdly, it shows that SSMs such as the DDM form a generalization of soft-max into the time 195
domain. Speculatively, the SSM may approximate the actual cognitive processes underlying value-based 196 decision making in learning tasks, and soft-max captures the choice function because it is an instantiation 197 (and simplification) of the SSM choice rule. 198
The mathematical relations between SSMs and soft-max are only theoretical in nature, and empirical 199
testing is required to assess whether SSMs can in fact describe choice behavior in learning tasks. As 200 preliminary evidence, it is possible to derive some simple predictions about empirical data in learning 201
tasks, by reasoning about the cognitive processes proposed by SSMs such as the DDM. More specifically, 202
if we assume that the DDM is the choice function underlying decisions in an instrumental learning task, 203 and the choice data is modelled using soft-max, then we can derive several predictions about empirical 204 response times in this learning task. Firstly, response times (as well as accuracy) should be a function of 205 both the difference in Q-values, and the inverse temperature parameter. The former is because drift rate 206 equals the difference between the two Q-values. When choice options are similar (and the Q-value 207 difference is small), the drift rate is low, which increases the average amount of time it takes to reach a 208 response boundary. A negative relation between Q-value differences and response times has indeed been 209 value-based decisions). Furthermore, a positive relation between choice times and the inverse temperature 211
parameter is implied because higher inverse temperatures are associated with higher threshold settings, 212
which implies that participants accumulate more evidence before they commit to a decision. We are not 213 aware of any literature specifically testing this (while simultaneously accounting for the influence of Q-214 value differences), but this likely holds because of the reported fits of combined RL-DDMs, which are 215 reviewed below. Finally, the assumption that the evidence accumulation start point is unbiased towards 216 either choice alternative entails that the response time distributions for both choice options are always 217 symmetric ('correct' and 'wrong' answers are equally fast). There is at least some evidence to support this Assume recursive update rule ݂ሺܳ|ߙሻ, sequential sampling model ℒሺܴܶ, ܿℎ‫,)ߠ|݁ܿ݅‬ and linking function ݃(ܳ, ߠ|߰) 2.
Generate proposal joint set of parameters ߙ, ߠ, ߰ 3.
‫ܚܗ‬
end if 10.
end for 11.
Calculate ߠ with linking function ݃(ܳ , ߠ|߰) 12.
Calculate likelihood ℒ(ܴܶ , ܿℎ‫݁ܿ݅‬ |ߠ ) 13. end for 14.
Calculate ∑ log ℒ(ܴܶ , ܿℎ‫݁ܿ݅‬ |ߠ ) ே ୀଵ as a measure of model fit to entire data set
Steps 2-14 are repeated using optimization algorithms until convergence. In the pseudo-code, ߙ is a set of parameters of the update rule (e.g., the learning rate in Equation 1), ߠ a set of parameters of the sequential sampling model (e.g., non-decision time, start point, and threshold of the DDM), and ߰ a set of parameters of the linking function (e.g., a slope parameter under the assumption of a linear relation between drift rates and Q-value differences). The initial value of Q is set to 0.5, formalizing that the subject's expected value of each choice option is unbiased at 0.5 (with "reward" being +1 and no reward +0) at the start of the experiment. Alternatively, this initial value could be estimated as a free parameter as well. N is the number of trials, and K the number of choice options under consideration.
The overall procedure is highly comparable to fitting an RL model with soft-max. The crucial difference lies in steps 11 and 12: A linking function is required, and the likelihood function is the sequential sampling model instead of soft-max. Compared to fitting a traditional SSM, steps 4-11 are added, whereas traditional SSM fitting requires only a single set of proposal parameters ߠ for the entire data set. studies illustrate that the approach also helps tackling problems of parameter recovery (Shahar et al., 231
2019; see also Ballard and McClure, 2019). Below, we review studies that formally link dynamics from a 232 learning model with a sequential sampling model, using data from value-based decision-making tasks 233 (e.g., instrumental learning tasks) that would traditionally have been analyzed with soft-max. However, 234
comparable approaches have also been used in the perceptual decision-making domain (Yu and Cohen, 235
2009; Zhang et al., 2014), and many of the benefits advocated in the current paper apply to that domain as 236
well. 237
The first study explicitly linking trial-to-trial evolution of expected values with drift rate in a DDM 238
was provided by Frank and colleagues (2015), although they did not use a temporal difference learning 239
rule but a Bayesian ideal observer model instead. In this simultaneous EEG-fMRI study, participants 240 performed a probabilistic category learning task (Frank et al., 2004; Figure 3A ). By jointly modelling 241 learning and decision-making processes, the authors showed that both the drift rate and threshold were 242 modulated by expected value. Furthermore, in a model-based cognitive neuroscience analysis, they 243
showed that decision thresholds were modulated by subthalamic nucleus (a small nucleus deep in the 244 brain) activity, as well as by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex but only under decision conflict. 245
Pedersen and colleagues (2017) further developed the cognitive modelling of combining learning 246 and the DDM, and used the SARSA learning rule instead of a Bayesian ideal observer model. They 247
showed that this combined RL-DDM was able to account for both response time distributions and 248 learning over time in data from a probabilistic selection task. A model comparison between various RL-249 DDM specifications showed that a linear mapping between the Q-value difference and drift rate, 250 combined with a time-varying threshold and different learning rates for updates after positive and 251 negative prediction errors provided the best fit to their data. They then applied this model to data of 252 patients diagnosed with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder to compare their behavior on and off 253 medication, and show that various RL-DDM parameters, including the boundary separation and learning 254 rates, were affected by ADHD medication. Interestingly, the authors demonstrated that the model was 255
able to fit most of the data well, but showed misfits in two aspects: It overestimated accuracy for difficult 256 decisions; and overestimated the differences in accuracy between choice difficulty levels at the end of the 257 experiment, while underestimating these differences in the beginning of the experiment (see Pedersen et 258 al., 2019, their Figure 3 ).
259
A similar study by Fontanesi and colleagues (2019a) aimed to extend hallmark findings in value-260
based decision making (i.e., the effects of choice difficulty, value magnitude, and value difference) to the 261 context of learning. Various RL, DDM, and integrated RL-DDMs were fit to the data, after which both 262 qualitative and quantitative model comparisons showed that only the integrated RL-DDM was able to 263 account for all aspects of the data (see Figure 3B ). In order to overcome the issue of overestimating gain could be earned. 269
In another study, Fontanesi and colleagues (2019b) applied the RL-DDM framework to understand 270
how context effects influence response times and accuracy in an instrumental learning task. They re-271
analyzed data from four experiments in which context was manipulated by altering the valence of 272 feedback: Participants had to learn to maximize gains for some choice options (reward learning), and 273 minimize losses for others (avoidance learning). Furthermore, participants received either feedback for 274 the rewards associated with both choice options (c.f. Figure 2A) , or only the choice option that was 275 actually chosen. Using the RELATIVE model (Palminteri et al., 2015) as a learning model, they showed 276 that the valence of feedback consistently affected non-decision time: In trials in which participants had to 277 make a decision in order to gain a reward, non-decision time was lower than in trials in which participants 278
had to decide in order to avoid a loss. Furthermore, giving full feedback instead of partial feedback 279 increased the drift rate and the threshold, and decreased the non-decision times of choices. Finally, in line 280
with earlier findings (Frank et al., 2015), decision conflict (the inverse of difficulty) affected the 281 threshold. These results are especially interesting since they show that the decision-making process is not 282 only affected by the expected reward, but also by the state that the decision-maker is in. 283
Sewell and colleagues (2019) took a related approach to modelling choice data from a probabilistic 284 learning task, using an associative network (ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992) instead of a classical 285
reinforcement learning model to model learned changes in associative strength between stimuli and 286 outcomes. This model was able to account for changes in choice probabilities and response latencies due 287
to learning, as well as the effect of choice difficulty. To do so, a non-linear linking function between 288
expected values and drift rates was required. However, they note that the model showed minor misfits in 289 two aspects of the data: It could not capture the observed asymmetry between response latencies 290 associated with correct and incorrect responses (errors were consistently slower; see Figure 3C ), and the 291 model predicted a higher skewness in the response time distributions than observed. 292
An interesting application of an integrated RL-DDM was given by Millner and colleagues (2018), 293 who used this framework to improve our understanding of how aversive Pavlovian biases shape choice 294
behavior. Such biases are thought to be the result of a hard-wired response to avoid aversive stimuli, and 295
have been previously associated with response inhibition. Using their Go-Nogo paradigm combined with 296 RL-DDM modelling, the authors showed not only that Pavlovian biases can also promote active behavior 297
(rather than only response inhibition), but that the bias was best understood as a response bias (or start 298 point bias) in decision-making. That is, when faced with an aversive stimulus, a Pavlovian bias reduces 299 the amount of evidence participants require to decide towards the response that minimizes the influence 300 of aversive stimuli, regardless of whether this response is active or passive. 301
It is important to highlight that in the studies mentioned above, the results could not have been 302
obtained without jointly modelling the learning and decision parts of the data. Furthermore, while all 303 models appear to be able to capture fundamental aspects of the decision and learning processes, misfits 304 remain, providing a challenge and opportunity for future model development. 305 
319
Benefits of integration 320
The previous section reviewed the current work on combining reinforcement learning models with SSMs, 321
providing several illustrations of how such integrated models can improve our understanding of learning 322
and decision making simultaneously. Here, we generalize beyond individual use-cases, and argue that 323
integration of the two modelling traditions is promising for both cognitive modelling and model-based 324 cognitive neuroscience. 325
Methodological benefits: Improved parameter recovery 326 Before parameters can be interpreted or related to neural measures, it is crucial that the true data-327
generating parameter values can be recovered from the model when it is fit to data (Moran, 2016; Spektor 328
and Kellen, 2018). Good parameter recovery involves reliably and accurately estimating the true 329 parameter values that generated a set of observed or simulated data, and provides a minimally necessary 330 condition that must be met before one can make inferences about latent cognitive processes from model 331 parameters. Although it may seem trivial, good recovery is a known issue for both RL models ( recognized the importance of good parameter recovery, and explicitly studied the recovery properties of 336 the models employed in their studies. These RL-DDMs recovered remarkably well given the numbers of 337 trials included. Another recent study showed that combining RL models with the DDM significantly 338
improves recovery compared to more common (relatively complex) RL mixture models (Shahar et al., 2019; see also Ballard and McClure, 2019) . The reason behind these good recovery properties is that 340
including response times increases the information content of the data, and the amount of constraint 341 offered by the data. In fact, in modelling the two-stage decision task ( influence on choice behavior. The RL-DDM specifically, in contrast, offers a different interpretation of 384 this parameter (and its behavioral effects) in terms of the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) (Tuerlinckx and 385
De Boeck, 2005): Some participants are slower and more accurate than others because they inform their 386 decisions based on more evidence (i.e., they set higher response thresholds). Unlike the traditional 387
interpretations of the inverse temperature parameter, this alternative interpretation thus makes formal 388 predictions about response times. These predictions furthermore entail more than a mere increase or 389 decrease in the mean response times, but are about the shapes of the entire response time distributions of 390 both correct and incorrect responses. Future experiments, for example using a classical speed/accuracy 391
trade-off manipulation, should test whether empirical data supports this interpretation. 392
On top of explicitly modelling SAT settings, RL studies may further benefit from the richness of 393 latent variables estimated using SSMs, such as the amount of time it takes for participants to perform 394 early perceptual processes and initiate motor responses (i.e., non-decision time), potential response biases, 395 and the efficiency with which participants process information (i.e., accumulation rates). One field where 396
this non-decision times and learning rates in patients with ADHD. These complex effects could not be 401 captured by the inverse temperature parameter of soft-max. 402
Model selection 403
Model selection entails finding the most parsimonious trade-off between quality of fit and model 404 complexity. However, in some cases, different models of the same complexity can make the exact same 405 predictions for choice data, which makes it difficult if not impossible to distinguish between these 406 models. In such a case, response times can provide additional and sometimes crucial constraint to inform 407 model selection. An example is the study of context effects on preferential decision-making, where it was 408
shown that some models can only be distinguished on the basis of the combination of choice and response of not a single decision-making process, but of a mixture between two or more processes (or cognitive 413 strategies). A well-known example in reinforcement learning are the model-free and model-based control 414 systems (Daw and Dayan, 2014). Model-free control assumes that Q-values are computed solely by trial-415
and-error (i.e., Equation 1), while model-based control assumes that Q-values are explicitly computed 416
based on an internal cognitive model of the world. Observed choice behavior is thought to be a mixture of 417 both types of control, and the mixture parameter, that denotes how reliant a subject is on either of these 418 strategies, is often analyzed (Daw et al., 2011). However, as also discussed above, the amount of 419 information in choice data alone is often too limited to reliably estimate parameters of such a mixture 420 model (Shahar et al., 2019).
421
The SSM framework offers exciting new ways to model competing choice strategies. One option is to 422 assume that Q-values are a mixture of the two control systems, and link the difference in Q-values to drift 423 rates of an SSM (Shahar et al., 2019). Another option would be to model the different strategies as a race 424 between accumulators, as is typically done in race models such as the linear, ballistic accumulator (LBA) 425
model (Brown and Heathcote, 2008) . This way, model selection between RL-SSMs provides a way to test 426 not only for the existence of multiple choice strategies in learning tasks, but also how exactly these 427 strategies interact and/or compete. 428
Benefits for sequential sampling models 429 An explicit theory of drift rates 430
From the perspective of SSMs, a major benefit from the integration is that an explicit theory of drift rates 431
is incorporated into the model, specifying exactly what constitutes the evidence that is being accumulated. 432
By equating (or non-linearly linking) drift rates with Q-value differences, RL-SSMs propose that 433 evidence accumulation is driven by (differences in) expected value. In simple instrumental learning tasks, 434
where model-free control drives choice behavior, Q-values are thought to be stored in procedural memory 435
(Gershman and Daw, 2017). By modelling such a task using a RL-SSM, the time it takes to perform 436
additional cognitive processes such as stimulus identification will be accounted for by the non-decision 437 time parameter, and variability in response latencies are a consequence of the noise in Q-value 438
accumulation. In more complex tasks (e.g., the two-stage decision task, Daw et al., 2011), Q-values can 439 either be thought of as a mixture of multiple control systems, or the decision-making process can be 440 modeled as a race between such control systems, as proposed above. 441
Single trial parameter estimates 442 RL models offer trial-by-trial estimates of expected value and prediction errors, which have been used in 443 model-based cognitive neuroscience to make inferences about trial-by-trial variability in neural measures. 444
This approach involves using expected values or prediction errors as parametric modulators in analyses of 445 neural data, and has proven to be very powerful in identifying the brain areas putatively involved in 446 computing and representing these variables (O'Doherty et al., 2007) . 447
The default SSM framework, by contrast, does not provide a single parameter estimate per trial. 448
Instead, one set of parameters per condition is typically estimated, and it is assumed that all responses 449 within this condition are independent draws from a single distribution. Apart from the fact that this 450 assumption is difficult to entertain (as evidenced, for example, by the phenomenon of post-error slowing; 451
Dutilh et al., 2012), it also limits the methodology of model-based cognitive neuroscience. Since only one 452 parameter estimate is available per condition and subject, assuming that all choice processes within that 453 condition are identical (except for within-trial noise), there is no explicit model of trial-by-trial dynamics 454
that can be used to analyze within-subject dynamics in neural measures. As an alternative approach, 455
between-subject dynamics are often analyzed, showing that the size of a between-condition BOLD-456 response contrast in certain brain areas (e.g., anterior striatum) covaries across subjects that the learning rate could be affected by imposing speed stress in the decision-making phase. The 512
underlying reasoning is that speed stress generally causes participants to inform their decisions based on 513 less evidence (i.e., low thresholds) (Heitz, 2014), which increases the likelihood of an error and thereby 514 decreases the information content in an error compared to errors that occur when choices are based on a 515 lot of evidence (i.e., high thresholds). test whether the similarity in neural systems alludes to the same cognitive processes playing a role in both 530
RL and decision-making, or that different cognitive processes are underpinned by the same neural 531
substrates. 532
The suggestions above only scratch the surface of the plethora of modelling options in combining 533 RL and SSMs. This combinatorial explosion of modelling options simultaneously forms a challenge for 534 future research. From the RL framework, multiple learning rules can be taken, as well as additional 535 mechanisms (mentioned briefly above) such as multiple learning rates, eligibility traces, choice 536 perseveration, and mixture modelling. Further, as detailed above, there exists a multitude of SSMs, 537
including the DDM with various parametrizations, and race models such as racing diffusion accumulators 538 and the LBA, and urgency models. Finally, as already shown by the current literature, there are multiple 539 linear and nonlinear linking functions possible between RL model dynamics and SSM parameters. Again, 540
this landscape of options is exciting, but risks post-hoc modelling decisions and overfitting issues. 541
Selecting the most theoretically informative combination of RL and SSM mechanisms and the most 542 appropriate linking functions from this broad landscape will be an important challenge for future model 543 development and selection.
544
A second (and related) challenge is to make quantitative comparisons between models that vary in 545 the dimensionality of the data they explain. More specifically, traditional RL models using soft-max treat 546
data as univariate (i.e., choices only), whereas combined RL-SSMs treat data as multivariate (i.e., choices 547
with associated response latencies). An unpractical consequence of this difference in dimensionality is 548 that likelihood estimates of soft-max and SSMs (and, by extension, model comparison metrics such as 549 AIC (Akaike, 1973) and BIC (Schwarz, 1978) , and their Bayesian extensions such as the DIC 550
(Spiegelhalter et al., 2002)) are informed by different data, and cannot be directly compared. A potential 551 option to overcome this issue is to resort to cross-validation techniques (e.g., Ahn et al., 2008; 552
Steingroever et al., 2014). In such techniques, the models are fit to part of the data, and subsequently used 553
to generate predictions on choice behavior in a separate part of the data. With RL-SSMs, it would be 554 possible to repeatedly fit the model to the first n trials, and predict the choice and response time for trial 555 n+1. The accuracy of such predictions can be compared and interpreted as a measure of generalizability. 556
Apart from these relative model selection criteria, it is important to also assess the absolute quality of fit 557
(Palminteri et al., 2017), to ensure that the model is able to capture key phenomena in the data. 558
Neither of these challenges poses a fundamental hurdle to integrating the cognitive model classes.
559
Moreover, although the articles reviewed here focus on value-based decision-making, very similar 560 benefits also apply to the perceptual learning domain (e.g., Diaz et al., 2017; Lak et al., 2017). Careful 561 model development, combined with experimental work and tests of specific influence, has the potential to 562
offer the field of model-based cognitive neuroscience a powerful new tool for measuring and interpreting 563 behavioral and neural data within a single theoretical framework encompassing a variety of cognitive 564
processes. 565 566
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